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Abstract
In the framework of mechanism design theory, in order to implement a desired
social choice function in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a designer constructs a mecha-
nism which species her favorite outcome for each possible prole of agents' types.
Generally speaking, each agent's strategy has two possible formats: an action, or a
message. In this paper, we focus on the former case and claim that the denitions
of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and Bayesian incentive compatibility
should all be based on a prot function instead of a utility function. Next, we de-
rive the main result: Given a social choice function which can be implemented by
an indirect mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if all strategies of agents are
costly actions, then it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct mechanism that
can truthfully implement the social choice function in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Key words: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Mechanism design; Revelation Principle.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1{3], there are one designer
and some agents. 1 The designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which species her favorite outcome for each possible prole
of agents' types. However, each agent's type is modelled as his private property
and unknown to the designer. In order to implement a social choice function
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the designer constructs a mechanism which
 Corresponding author.
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1 The designer is denoted as \She", and the agent is denoted as \He".
species each agent's strategy set (i:e:, the allowed actions of each agent) and
an outcome function (i:e:, a rule for how agents' actions get turned into a
social choice).
Generally speaking, each agent's strategy has two possible formats: an action,
or a message (i.e., a plan of action) (Page 883, Line 8, [1]). The distinction
between the two formats is that: the former format of strategy is a real ac-
tion which is performed realistically by each agent and hence naturally needs
some action cost, whereas the latter format of strategy is a message of action
plan which is reported to the designer and hence doesn't need any cost to
be performed realistically. In this paper, we focus on the former format of
strategy, and investigate what would happen to the notion of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce a notion of prot func-
tion (i.e., Denition 1), and then claim that the notions of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a mechanism and Bayesian incentive compatibility should all
be based on the prot function instead of the utility function when strategies
of agents are costly actions (i.e., Denition 2 and Denition 3). Next, we de-
rive the main result (i.e., Proposition 1): Given a social choice function which
can be implemented by an indirect mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
if all strategies of agents are costly actions, then it cannot be inferred that
there exists a direct mechanism that can truthfully implement f in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, which contradicts the revelation principle. Afterwards, we
consider a possible argument and give a reply. Section 3 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Analysis
Consider a setting with one designer and I agents indexed by i = 1;    ; I.
Each agent i privately observes his type i that determines his preference
over elements in an outcome set X. The set of possible types for agent i is
denoted as i. The vector of agents' types  = (1;    ; I) is drawn from set
 = (1;    ;I) according to probability density (), and each agent i's
utility function over the outcome x 2 X given his type i is ui(x; i).
A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of I strategy sets S1;    ; SI
and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X. The mechanism combined
with possible types (1;    ;I), the probability density () over the possible
realizations of  2 1      I , and utility functions (u1;    ; uI) denes
a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The strategy function of each
agent i in the game induced by   is a private function si() : i ! Si. Each
strategy set Si contains agent i's possible strategies (i:e:, actions, or plans of
action). The outcome function g() describes the rule for how agents' strategies
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get turned into a social choice. A social choice function (SCF) is a function
f : 1      I ! X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types
1;    ; I , assigns a collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Note 1: As given above, for each agent i with type i, there are two possible
formats of his strategy si(i): an action, or a message.
Case 1 : If the format of strategy si(i) is an action, then si(i) should be
performed by agent i realistically. Hence, it is reasonable to say that in order
to perform the action si(i), agent i with type i needs to spend some monetary
cost (or make some eort which can be quantied as some monetary cost).
Case 2 : If the format of strategy si(i) is a message, then si(i) is just a plan
of action but not a realistic action. 2
In the following discussions, we will focus on the former case and investigate
what would happen in this case to the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in the game induced by a mechanism. To simplify representations, we assume
that each agent's action cost is only relevant to his action and private type,
and is independent of the game outcome.
Denition 1: For a given social choice function f , consider a mechanism   =
(S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Suppose
each agent i's strategy in the game induced by   is a costly action si(i) :
i ! Si, then the corresponding action cost is dened by a cost function
ci(si; i) : Si  i ! R+, i.e., ci(si; i)  0 for any si 2 Si, i 2 i. Let the
outcome yielded by the mechanism be x 2 X and agent i's utility function
be ui(x; i) : X  i ! R, then each agent i's prot is dened by a prot
function pi(x; si; i) : X  Si i !R,
pi(x; si; i) = ui(x; i)  ci(si; i): (1)
Discussion 1: Someone may argue that when each agent i performs the
strategy action si with cost ci(si; i)  0, his utility ui(x; i) already includes
the action cost. Thus, it is not necessary to introduce another notion of prot
function pi(x; si; i) to make confusion.
Answer 1: It should be noted that the utility function ui(x; i) contains
only two parameters, i.e., the outcome x and the private type i. There is no
parameter in ui(x; i) to represent the item of action cost. Put dierently, the
utility function ui(x; i) only corresponds to agent i's utility after obtaining the
outcome x, but cannot describes his cost spent in performing the action si(i).
Consequently, the prot function pi(x; si; i) should be introduced to describe
how much each agent i benets from the game induced by a mechanism when
his strategy is a costly action. 2
According to MWG book [1], a strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and
all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji] (2)
for all s^i 2 Si.
Note 2: As shown above, the conventional notion of Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium is based on the utility function ui(x; i). Suppose that in an indirect
mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), the format of each agent i's strategy si(i)
is an action that requires some cost to be performed, i:e:, ci(si; i) > 0. As
pointed out in Answer 1, the utility function ui(x; i) only describes agent i's
utility with respect to the outcome x but misses his action cost, hence cannot
describe agent i's prot. Since it is the prot that each rational agent real-
ly concerns in a game, the prot function should be introduced to dene the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism. 2
Denition 2: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [pi(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); s

i (i); i)ji]  E i [pi(g(s^i; s i( i)); s^i; i)ji]
(3)
i:e:,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si, in which pi is the prot of agent i given by Eq (1).
According to MWG book [1], the mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) imple-
ments the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) =
f() for all  2 . A direct mechanism is a mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g())
in which Si = i for all i and g() = f() for all  2 1      I . 3 The
social choice function f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equi-
librium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if si (i) = i for all i 2 i and
i = 1;    ; I is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism
2 In most of practical cases, the format of each agent's strategy is a costly action.
Only in very limited cases (e:g:, strategies of agents can be considered as oral an-
nouncements) can strategies be viewed costless, and hence by Eq (1) the utility
function is equal to the prot function. Therefore, the conventional denition of
Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on the utility function holds only in these limited
cases.
3 Here we use a bar symbol to distinguish a direct mechanism from an indirect
mechanism.
4
  = ( S1;    ; SI ; g()), in which Si = i, g = f . That is, if for all i = 1;    ; I
and all i 2 i, ^i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]: (4)
Note 3: In the direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()), the format of each
agent i's strategy is a message, i.e., each agent i independently determines the
report strategy si() : i ! i, and his report type si(i) does not need to
be his true type i. Let each agent i's reporting cost be denoted as ci(si; i) :
i  i ! R+, i.e., ci(si; i)  0. 4 Let the outcome yielded by   be x 2 X,
then each agent i's prot in the direct mechanism can be denoted by:
pi(x; si; i) = ui(x; i)  ci(si; i): (5)
In the literature, it is usually assumed that each agent i can report his true
type costlessly, i:e:, the truthful report cost ci(i; i) = 0. However, each agent
i's misreporting cost may not be zero, i.e., ci(^i; i)  0, ^i 6= i, ^i 2 i. 5
Therefore, following Denition 2, the denition of Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility should also be revised as follows.
Denition 3: Suppose in the direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()), each
agent i's truthful report cost ci(i; i) = 0 and misreporting cost ci(^i; i) 
0, ^i 6= i, then the social choice function f is truthfully implementable in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if for all i =
1;    ; I and all i 2 i, ^i 2 i,
E i [pi(f(i;  i); i; i)ji]  E i [pi(f(^i;  i); ^i; i)ji];
i.e.,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [(ui(f(^i;  i); i)  ci(^i; i))ji]: (6)
Note 4: In a direct mechanism, the only thing that the designer knows about
each agent i is his report type si 2 i. After the designer receives s1;    ; sI
from agents, she has no way to verify whether these reports are truthful or not.
All that the designer can do is just to announce f(s1;    ; sI) as the outcome.
Thus, in a direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()), each agent i with type
4 From the perspective of each agent i, reporting a type si in the direct mechanism
is simply to announce a message, and is distinct from the strategy si chosen by
him in the indirect mechanism. Thus, the reporting cost ci(si; i) occurred in a
direct mechanism is dierent from the strategy cost ci(si; i) occurred in an indirect
mechanism.
5 For example, some researchers investigated misreporting cost [5,6], which are
possibly spent by agents when reporting a false type.
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i does not need to perform any strategy si(i) 2 Si specied in any indirect
mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), and consequently does not need to spend
any strategy cost ci(si; i).
6 2.
Proposition 1: For a given social choice function f , suppose that there exists
an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements it in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. If the format of each agent's strategy si 2 Si is a costly
action, i:e:, ci(si; i) > 0, then it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct
mechanism that can truthfully implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the given social choice function f , and the indirect mecha-
nism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
the mapping g(s()) : 1      I ! X from a vector of agents' type-
s  = (1;    ; I) into an outcome g(s()) is equal to the desired outcome
f(), i:e:, g(s()) = f() for all  2 1     I .
By Denition 2, for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si. Thus, for all i and all i 2 i, ^i 2 i
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s

i (^i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (^i); i))ji]:
Since g(s()) = f() for all , then for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(f(i;  i); i) ci(si (i); i))ji]  E i [(ui(f(^i;  i); i) ci(si (^i); i))ji];
for all ^i 2 i. Note that the above inequality cannot infer the inequality (6).
Consequently, it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct mechanism that
can truthfully implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
Discussion 2: Someone may disagree with Note 4 and Proposition 1, and
propose a \direct revelation game" as follows. For a given social choice func-
tion f , suppose there is an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that
implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium strategy is
6 Someone may argue that in a direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()), in addition
to choose a type si 2 i to report, each agent may also be willing to perform an
additional strategy si(i) 2 Si as what he would perform in some indirect mechanism
  = (S1;    ; SI ; g()). However, this argument requires each agent to do beyond
the framework of the direct mechanism, since this additional strategy si(i) 2 Si is
meaningless and illegal in the direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()).
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s = (s1;    ; sI). Consider this equilibrium, there is a mapping from vectors
of agents' types into outcomes. Now we take the mapping to be a revelation
game, i:e:, each agent i with private type i independently chooses a type
^i 2 i to report to the designer, and the designer suggests each agent an
action si (^i) 2 Si. Then no type of any agent can benet by reporting a false
type ^i 6= i and performing the suggested action si (^i). As a result, truth-
telling is the equilibrium strategy of this game, i.e., each agent i reports his
true type i and performs the same strategy action s

i (i) as what he would
perform in the indirect mechanism.
Answer 2: It should be emphasized that in the direct revelation game, each a-
gent i with private type i can choose an arbitrary type ^i 2 i to report to the
designer. Thus, in order to know which action si (^i) 2 Si should be suggest-
ed to each agent, the designer must know not only one specic action si (i),
but also the full details of each agent i's strategy function si () : i ! Si.
However, the designer is always at the information disadvantage in a mecha-
nism: she does not know each agent i's private type i, or his private strategy
function si () : i ! Si. All that the designer knows from each agent i is just
one report si (i).
7 Therefore, the direct revelation game takes it for granted
that the designer can suggest each agent which strategy action he should play
after receiving a report type from each agent, but actually does not hold. 2
3 Conclusion
This paper mainly investigates the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
a mechanism when strategies of agents are costly actions. This work is also
relevant to the foundation of revelation principle. So far, there have been sev-
eral discussions on possible failures of the revelation principle. Kephart and
Conitzer [6] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless and misreport-
ing is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold. Bester and Strausz [7]
pointed out that the revelation principle may fail because of imperfect com-
mitment. Martimort and Stole [8] said that the revelation principle does not
apply to situations where several mechanism designers compete against each
other.
The main result of this paper is that: When strategies of agents are costly
actions, the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism should
be based on the prot function. As a result, the notion of Bayesian incentive
7 Otherwise, assume to the contrary that the designer knows each agent i's strategy
function si (), then she can easily infer each agent i's private type i from his report
si(i). This case contradicts the basic framework of mechanism design and does not
hold.
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compatibility should also be revised. This is the key point why the revelation
principle may fail when strategies of agents are costly actions.
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